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Lay, Expert, or Something Else?
by H. Patrick Furman
This article discusses opinion testimony of lay witnesses and expert witnesses. Itprovides an overview of lay
opinion testimony and discusses the dividing line between lay and opinion testimony.
he dividing line between traditional experts and lay people
is easy to draw analytically, but sometimes difficult to ad-
min ster in practice. There re at least two reasons for this.
First, regardless of whether a witness is an expert or a lay person, it
often is difficult to separate "fact" from "opinion" and to separate
"opinion" from "speculation."The commentary following Federal
Rule of Evidence (ER.E.) 701 notes that witnesses "often find dif-
ficulty in expressing themselves in language which is not that of an
opinion or conclusion." Second, the growing number of witnesses
who have special education, training, and/or experience, but who
are not "experts" in the traditional sense, creates difficulty in ad-
ministering the rule. This problem manifests itself most frequently
in the testimony of police officers who have specialized training in
an area-for example, roadside sobriety testing and driving under
the influence (DUI) detection and accident reconstructions-but
are not traditionally thought of as experts.
It is important to place witnesses on one side or the other of the
lay/expert divide. Discovery and disclosure rules in criminal cases
are different when it comes to expert witnesses, and require coun-
sel to inform opposing counsel of an intention to call expert wit-
nesses, as well as to provide certain data used by such an expert.'
The advocacy techniques to qualify an expert witness and elicit his
or her testimony also are different. Finally, the broad discretion
typically granted to trial courts in ruling on the admissibility of
opinion testimony reduces the likelihood of reversal on appeal, and
increases the need to persuade the trial judge to rule in the client's
favor.
This article begins with a brief review of basic considerations re-
lating to lay opinion testimony: traditionally admissible lay opin-
ions, the relevancy requirement, the ban on speculation, the foun-
dation requirements, the "ultimate issue" issue, and some advocacy
considerations. The article then focuses on the dividing line be-
tween lay and opinion testimony.
A Brief Review of Lay Opinion Testimony
Lay opinion testimony is governed by Rule 701,2 which reads:
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness's testi-
mony in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those
opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the per-
ception of the witness, (b) helpfl to a clear understanding of the
witness's testimony or the determination of a fact in issue, and
(c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowl-
edge within the scope of Rule 702.
The witness's testimony must be in the form of "opinions or infer-
ences." Speculation is objectionable. There are a few cases address-
ing the distinction between fact and opinion, but case law on the
distinction between lay opinion and lay speculation is almost non-
existent. The cases generally just re-state the rule that opinion is
permissible, but speculation without an adequate factual basis is
not.
In a proper case, a competent observer may be permitted to state
her estimate or opinion as to the age of another, and the esti-
mate will be rejected as without legally sufficient probative value
only if it is "surmise, speculation, conjecture or guesswork."
3
Even when the topic is one that normally is within the purview of
lay opinion, there must be an adequate foundation. "[W]hen no
sufficient facts are shown upon which to base an opinion of the
speed of the vehicle, the opinion is mere conjecture and specula-
tion."
4
The witness's testimony must be "helpful to a clear understand-
ing of the witness's testimony or the determination of a fact in is-
sue." State v. Brown5 has been cited by a number of courts for its
Article Editor About the Author
Morris Hoffman, judge for the Second H. Patrick Furman, Boulder, is Clinical Professor of Law at the University of
Judicial District Court, Denver Colorado Law Schoo1-303) 492-2638, furman@colorado.edu.
Criminal Law articles are sponsored by the CBA Criminal Law Section and generally are written by prosecutors, defense lawyers, and judges to provide infor-
mation about case law; legislation; and advocacy affecting the prosecution, defense, and administration of criminal cases in Colorado state and federal courts.
The Colorado Lawyer I June 2008 I Vol. 37, No. 6 33
CRIMINAL LAW
discussion of the relevancy requirement of Rule 701. After noting
the general principle that nonexpert witnesses generally are con-
fined to testifying about facts and are precluded from offering
opinions, the court noted: "[a]n exception to this general rule ex-
ists where testimony in an opinion form describes the witness's ob-
servations in the only way in which they can be clearly described."6
The examples given in Brown were "that a footprint in snow
looked like someone had slipped ... or that a substance appeared to
be blood." 7 Brown itself allowed testimony from a lay witness that
a particular burn looked like it had been made by a cigarette.
The witness's testimony must be "rationally based on the per-
ception of the witness." Experts may rely on facts made known to
them in a variety of ways; lay witnesses may opine on topics as to
which they have some direct knowledge. Opinion testimony by lay
witnesses must be "predicated upon concrete facts within their own
observation and recollection-that is, facts perceived from their
own senses, as distinguished from their opinions or conclusions
drawn from such facts." 8 The Colorado Supreme Court held that,
"for an opinion of a lay witness to be 'rationally based on the per-
ception of the witness,' it must be based on personal knowledge."9
Accordingly, it held that a review of two police reports did not
form an adequate foundation to permit a witness to testify about
the person who was the subject of those reports.
Finally, a lay witness's opinion may not be "based on scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule
702." Before addressing this distinction in detail, it may be helpfil
to remember that many types of lay opinions have long been
deemed admissible.
A lay opinion that a person is under the influence of alcohol has
been deemed admissible since well before the adoption of the Fed-
eral and Colorado Rules of Evidence.' 0 Lay testimony about drugs
has been treated like lay testimony about alcohol, with a finding
that such testimony does not require any specialized training or
knowledge, at least as long as the testifying witness has some fa-
miliarity with drugs." Other lay opinions that have been deemed
admissible without much discussion of whether they actually
might be expert opinions include those relating to:
* the speed of a car
12
* a defendant's sanity
13
* a defendant's capacity to form specific intent 14
• a testator's soundness of mind
5
• whether a sexual encounter was consensual1 6
* whether a person's language and behavior were indicative -of
jealousy and abusiveness
17
* whether the use of a deadly weapon was justified by safety
considerations' s
* the motivation or intent of another person. 19
Distinguishing Lay and Expert Opinion
Rule 701 draws the distinction between lay and expert testimo-
ny in two clauses. The Rule begins with the phrase "If the witness
is not testifying as an expert... ."The Rule concludes with a ban
on opinions that are "based on scientific, technical or other special-
ized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702."This latter phrase
was added to the federal rule in 2000 in response to the decision
in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,20 and to the Colo-
rado rule in 2003 in response to the opinion in People v. Shreck.
21
Additionally, there is significant case law concerning the proper
boundary between lay opinion and expert opinion. As already
mentioned, because experts are treated quite differently from lay
witnesses-for discovery, with regard to the bases on which they
can form an opinion, as to instructions, and for purposes of pay-
ment-placing a witness on one side or the other of this boundary
can be important.
The problem of distinguishing between lay and expert opinion
can arise with any witness who has training or education beyond
that of the "average" person. The way in which it occurs most fre-
quently in criminal cases is with the testimony of police officers
who have received, at the least, basic training in various aspects of
law enforcement, and may have received advanced training in one
or more specific areas of law enforcement.
In People v. Stewart,22 the Colorado Supreme Court noted the
difficulty involved in categorizing a police officer's opinions as ex-
pert or lay. In fact, the Court noted that the "application of Rule
701 to police officer testimony has generated equal measures of
confusion and controversy."2 3 The Court noted that "police offi-
cers regularly, and appropriately, offer testimony under [C.R.E.]
701 based on their perceptions and experiences." 24 To the Court,
the distinction between lay and expert opinion is that "when an of-
ficer's opinions require the application of, or reliance on, special-
ized skills or training, the officer must be qualified as an expert be-
fore offering such testimony."25 Officer testimony becomes objec-
tionable when what is essentially expert testimony is improperly
admitted under the guise of lay opinions.
2 6
Stewart involved a police officer testifying about a traffic acci-
dent without being qualified as an expert. The officer had received
240 hours of instruction in investigating traffic accidents, includ-
ing eighty hours of "intense technique in accident investigation."
27
Defense counsel was concerned that the officer would be used as
an expert, despite the fact that the disclosures and procedural re-
quirements relating to expert witnesses had not been satisfied, and
asked for an offer of proof as to the officer's testimony. The prose-
cution responded that the officer would describe "what he did in
the accident investigation." 21 On this basis, the trial court conclud-
ed that the officer would not be testifying as an expert.
The Supreme Court held this ruling to be error, concluding:
[W]here, as here, an officer's testimony is based not only on her
perceptions and observations of the crime scene, but also on her
specialized training or education, she must be properly qualified
as an expert before offering testimony that amounts to expert
testimony.
29
The Court went on to hold harmless the erroneous admission of
the officer's testimony.
Stewart cited with approval an article "urging courts to be vigi-
lant to preclude manipulative conduct designed to thwart the ex-
pert disclosure and discovery process." 30 The Court also reviewed
federal court decisions drawing the lay/expert line. The Eleventh
Circuit has held a detective who deciphered drug "hieroglyphics"
in a telephone directory properly offered expert testimony in de-
scribing how he had decoded the information, while noting that
other courts considered the interpretation of drug ledgers to be ex-
pert testimony.31 The Eleventh Circuit distinguished the other cas-
es by finding that the police officers in those cases relied on previ-
ous experience, while the police officer in the case at bar did his de-
ciphering in front of the jury. The Ninth Circuit has held that law
enforcement agents offering testimony that the defendant's con-
duct was consistent with that of an experienced narcotics trafficker
could not testify as lay witnesses.32
34 The Colorado Lawyer I June 2008 I Vol. 37, No. 6
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Post-Amendment Cases never qua
C.R.E. 701 was amended-in 2003, after the decision in Stew- arette bur
art-and now conforms to the 2000 amendment to its federal mony tha
counterpart. The language that was added to both is contained in which the
subsection (c), making it clear that a lay opinion cannot be based
on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the The Pec
scope of Rule 702. People
The Stewart Court took notice of the change to the federal rule lay opinic
and noted that the amendment to ER.E. 701 was not intended to defendant
alter the admissibility of lay opinion testimony; it merely was de- on variou
signed "to eliminate confusion between Rules 701 and 702 and to victim's id
clarify the distinction between lay and expert testimony.33 "Indeed, array. On
the amendment serves more to prohibit the inappropriate admis- "in allowi
sion of expert opinion under Rule 701 than to change the substan- pert witne
tive requirements of the admissibility of lay opinion. 34 The of photo
amendment was designed "to eliminate the risk that the reliability that wher
requirements set forth in Rule 702 will be evaded through the sim- cialized si
ple expedient of proffering an expert in lay witness clothing. 3 5  pert befo
In Rin
The State v. Brown Opinion ences wit
The federal amendment was based, in turn, on two U.S. Su- graphic li
preme Court decisions36 and the Tennessee Supreme Court deci- identify a
sion, State v. Brown.37 The Brown court held that: graphs sin
[t]he distinction between an expert and a non-expert witness is knowledg
that a non-expert witness's testimony results from a process of ordinary
reasoning familiar in everyday life and an expert's testimony re- Howev
sults from a process of reasoning which can be mastered only by pressed w
specialists in the field.
3"
The Court in Brown noted that a lay witness with experience Specificl
could testify that a substance appeared to be blood, but that a wit- aoc
ness would have to qualify as an expert before he could testify that of a photoof the per!
bruising around the eyes is indicative of skull trauma. That is the officer wa
kind of distinction made by the amendment to Rule 701. At the lyfiuerof
same time, Brown found that the testimony of a nurse, who was ly, use of cal court di
lified as an expert witness, that a bum "looked like" a cig-
n was admissible, because it fell into the category of testi-
.t "describes the witness's observations in the only way in
y can be clearly described."
39
Ipie v. Rincon Opinion
v. Rincon40 addressed, in some detail, the boundaries of
rn testimony under the new version of C.R.E. 701. The
was convicted of manslaughter and assault, and appealed
s grounds. The defendant questioned the reliability of the
[entification of him as the perpetrator in a photographic
e of his arguments on appeal was that the trial court erred
ng a police officer, who had not been qualified as an ex-
ess, to testify about the likelihood of picking offenders out
arrays.4i Rincon relied heavily on Stewart and reiterated
opinions "require the application of, or reliance on, spe-
kills or training, the [witness] must be qualified as an ex-
re offering such testimony."42
con, a police officer was asked to testify about his experi-
h people who were picking photographs out of photo-
neups. He testified that it often takes longer for people to
photograph than a live person, and that some photo-
ply do not depict features well. The court of appeals ac-
;ed that the officer had experience with lineups that an
citizen does not have, and this distinguished the officer
person.
er, the court concluded that "the opinion the officer ex-
as one which could be reached by any ordinary person."
43
ly, the court deemed it to be simple common sense to
'that witnesses are sometimes unable to pick a person out
array when an incident occurred quickly or when some
sons features are not depicted therein.... "44 Because the
s testifying to "the result of a process of reasoning (name-
ommon sense and logic) familiar in everyday life" the tri-
d not err in admitting the opinion under C.R.E. 701.45
The People v. Veren Opinion
In another post-Stewart decision, People
v. Veren, 46 the court of appeals addressed
"qualified lay" opinion that possession of
large amounts of"pseudoephedrine is in-
dicative of a person's intent to use such a
product as a precursor in the manufacture of
methamphetamine." 47 The testimony was
offered through a police officer who had re-
ceived basic training and specific training re-
lating to drug manufacture and precursor
drugs, and who had been on the beat for
four years.
The court parsed out the limits of the of-
ficer's lay opinions as follows. Although a
statute specifically provides that pseu-
doephedrine is a precursor drug, the officer
could not testify that possession of large
amounts of the drug was indicative of an in-
tent to manufacture methamphetamine, be-
cause "the amount of pseudoephedrine re-
quired to manufacture methamphetamine is
not within the common knowledge of ordi-
36 The Colorado Lawyer IJune 2008 1 Vol. 37, No. 6
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nary citizens, but rather requires specialized knowledge." 48 Simi-
larly, testimony that the combination of drugs seized from the de-
fendant commonly was used to manufacture methamphetamine,
and testimony about the actual process of manufacturing metham-
phetamine, both should be characterized as expert testimony on
the same basis.
The People v. Atencio Opinion
In another 2005 drug case, the court of appeals addressed the is-
sue from the other side, and rejected defendant's claim that a police
officer should not have been allowed to testify as an expert that the
quantity of cocaine found on the defendant was consistent with
someone distributing cocaine.49 The officer had two years of expe-
rience as a narcotics investigator for a regional drug task force and
also had attended numerous specialized training programs con-
cerning the use and distribution of narcotics. The court qualified
him as an expert, which is a determination within the broad dis-
cretion of the trial court, and allowed him to testify that a typical
user consumes up to three grams per day and that four ounces of
a controlled substance was an amount consistent with distribution,
rather than with personal use.
Other Cases
Some cases suggest that an opinion that normally would require
an expert witness may be admissible through a lay witness if that
witness has a strong factual foundation for the opinion. In People
v. Baird,50 a police officer was allowed to testify that when the de-
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fendant stabbed him, the sword would have hit his heart had he
not been wearing his body armor. The court noted that there was
ample other testimony on this issue, so the lay/expert distinction
was not particularly important. The court also noted that the wit-
ness properly testified that the sword was very sharp, that it came
near the officer's heart, and that the force of the blow was sufficient
to push the officer backward. It does not require a great leap of log-
ic or any special expertise to reach the conclusion that such a blow
might well have hit the officer's heart.
The most recent Colorado appellate pronouncement on the is-
sue was People v. Mallay.5' Using a plain error analysis, the court of
appeals held that the trial court did not err in allowing a police of-
ficer to testify about the most common ways to use methampheta-
mines without having been endorsed as an expert witness. Due to
the loss of the pipe and lighters seized from the defendant, the
court ruled that the items could not be characterized as drug para-
phernalia, but that the arresting officer could describe them and
testify as to how they are used to smoke methamphetamines. After
testifying that he had training in connection with the manufacture
and identification of methamphetamines and other drugs and how
they are used, the officer described the most common methods of
using methamphetamines.
The court declined to decide
whether the officer's testimony was lay or expert testimony, that
is, whether it depended on a process of reasoning familiar in
everyday life or on a process that can be mastered only by spe-
cialists in the field[,]
The Colorado Lawyer I June 2008 I Vol. 37, No. 6 37
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because the defendant did not object at the time the testimony was
offered. In the absence of an objection, the court employs a "plain
error" test. Plain error is obvious, substantial, and grave error
that seriously affects the substantial rights of the accused and so
undermines the fundamental fairness of the trial itself as to cast
serious doubt on the reliability of the judgment of conviction.
The court found no plain error, because: (1) the officer was qualified
to offer this testimony; (2) the defendant did not claim that he was
surprised by the testimony; and (3) the defendant put on a witness
who talked about the ways in which methamphetamines are used.
Other formulations of the dividing line between lay and expert
opinion testimony have been suggested. According to the com-
mentary following ER.E. 701, the testimony must be "scrutinized"
to determine whether it is "based on scientific, technical or other
specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702." The Tenth
Circuit has held that:
[t]he proper inquiry concerning expert evidence is simply
whether the jury is able to understand the evidence without the
specialized knowledge that is available from the testimony of an
expert witness.
52
The same Circuit subsequently held that "a person may testify as a
lay witness only if his opinions or inferences do not require any
specialized knowledge and could be reached by any ordinary per-
son." 53 One commentator has stated that "opinion testimony
should only be considered lay and not expert opinion if the aver-




One recurring situation in which the courts must draw this line is
the administration of roadside sobriety tests by a police officer who
suspects a driver is under the influence of alcohol or drugs. United
States v. Horn55 is one of the most thorough evaluations of the pro-
priety of having police officers testify about the performance of
roadside sobriety tests and the meaning of those performances. The
opinion reviewed a number of scientific studies of the accuracy of
roadsides and the relationship between a person's performance on
roadsides and his or her specific blood or breath alcohol concentra-
tion.The court also reviewed the treatment given to such testimony
by a number of state courts. For purposes of a discussion of lay and
qualified lay opinion testimony, Horn can be summarized as holding
that a police officer can testify as a lay person as to his or her obser-
vations of a defendant performing standard field sobriety tests (SF-
STs), but such opinion must not include claims of a scientific basis
unless the officer is qualified as an expert.
The ruling that a police officer can testify as a lay person as to
his or her observation of a defendant performing standard road-
side sobriety maneuvers is unremarkable. "There is near universal
agreement that lay opinion testimony about whether someone was
intoxicated is admissible if it meets the criteria [of Rule 702]."56
The officer may testify about his or her training in the administra-
tion of such tests, but may not, unless qualified as an expert, testify
about scientifically based claims of accuracy.
Horn limited such testimony by holding that the officer "may
not bolster the lay opinion testimony by reference to any scientific,
38 The Colorado Lawyer I June 2008 1 Vol. 37, No. 6
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technical or specialized information learned from law enforcement
or traffic safety instruction." 57 The court addressed this limitation
more specifically by holding that the officer
may not use value-added descriptive language to characterize
the subject's performance of the SFSTs, such as saying that the
subject "failed the test" or "exhibited" a certain number of"stan-
dardized clues" during the test.58
The court precluded such testimony on the ground that studies of
the reliability of roadsides had reached significantly different con-
clusions about the reliability of the tests.
Horn went on to discuss certain specific roadside tests in detail,
and also examined the link between the "horizontal gaze nystag-
mus" test and blood alcohol concentration. These parts of the rul-
ing are of particular interest to lawyers handling DUI cases, but the
analysis in Horn should be applicable whenever the proposed wit-
ness has training beyond that of an average lay person, but is not
an expert in the traditional sense of that word, and the testing done
by the witness is based on both common sense and science.
The "Qualified Lay Witness"
As the above cases demonstrate, there is a recurring problem
facing trial lawyers and judges with respect to how to categorize
witnesses, such as police officers, who have training beyond that of
the ordinary person, but who are not experts in the traditional
sense. Although the Stewart decision predated the amendment to
C.R.E. 701, it did consider the federal amendments, which are
identical to the subsequent Colorado amendments, and the deci-
sion remains persuasive and frequently cited authority for the ac-
knowledgement that there is difficulty in describing the dividing
line, and for the proposition that witnesses fall on one side of the
line or the other. The distinction between lay and expert opinion
is that "when an officer's opinions require the application of, or re-
liance on, specialized skills or training, the officer must be qualified
as an expert before offering such testimony."59 Officer testimony
becomes objectionable when what essentially is expert testimony
is improperly admitted under the guise of lay opinions.60
In short, there is no middle ground. A witness who offers an
opinion is doing so either as a lay witness or an expert witness. Rule
16 requires both the prosecution 61 and the defense62 to provide ad-
ditional discovery in connection with expert witnesses. To avoid
discovery issues at trial, counsel who plans on calling a qualified lay
witness should either endorse that witness as an expert or seek
guidance from the trial court as to whether the witness will, in fact,
be deemed to be an expert by the court. Good advocacy suggests
the same conclusion. Given the fact that it is relatively easy to qual-
ify a witness as an expert, and the fact that jurors may well give
more weight to the testimony of a witness who has been so quali-
fied by the court, it makes sense as a matter of persuasion to quali-
fy and use witnesses as experts whenever possible.
Conclusion
The rules of evidence create two categories of opinions, those of
lay witnesses and those of expert witnesses. Because the two types
of witnesses are treated differently for both discovery and trial pur-
poses, it is incumbent on counsel to make the distinction clearly
and early in a case. Although there always will be some gray area
around the dividing line between these two types of witnesses,
there nonetheless is a line, and counsel should observe the distinc-
tion with his or her own witnesses and require opposing counsel
to do the same.
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Read a book. Write a review.
CBA members who are interested in reading a law-related book and writing a review for publication in The Colorado Lawyer
may contact Leona Martinez at leonamartinez@cobar.org for guidelines and deadlines. Please provide an abbreviated r6sum6 or
self-description, stating your areas of expertise and interest. The titles listed below were available at press time:
2008 Solo and Small Firm Legal Technology Guide: Criti-
cal Decisions Made Simple, by Sharon D. Nelson et al.
(ABA, 2008); 13 7 pp.
Access to Government in the ComputerAge.'An Examina-
tion of State Public Records Law, Martha Harrell Chum-
bier, ed. (ABA, 2007); 2 09 pp.
i The Bramble Bush: Classic Lectures on the Law and Law
School, by Karl N. Llewellyn (Oxford University Press,
Inc., 2008); 17 7 pp.
i Child Welfare Law and Practice: Representing Children,
Parents, and State Agencies in Abuse, Neglect, and Depen-
dency Cases, Marvin Ventrell and Donald N. Duquette,
eds. (Bradford Publishing Co., 2005); 7 19 pp.
Colorado Civil Pretrial Handbook, by Mary Price Birk
(Bradford Publishing Co., 2008); 4 5 5 pp.
Copyright's Paradox, by Neil Weinstock Netanel (Ox-
ford University Press, Inc., 2008); 218 pp.
O Guide to TTB Practice, Vols. 1 and 2, by Jeffery A.
Handelman (Aspen Publishers, 2008).
Q Patent Appeals: The Elements ofEffective Advocacy in the
Federal Circuit, by Mark Simon Davies (Oxford Uni-
versity Press, Inc., 2008); 2 8 4 pp.
Q School Administrator's Guide to the Family and Medical
Leave Act, by Carl C. Bosland (Rowman & Littlefield
Education, 2007); 571 pp.
9 The Science of Settlement-Ideasfor Negotiators, by Barry
Goldman (ALI-ABA, 2008); 16 7 pp. + glossary and
bibliography.
Trial ManualforDefenseAttorneys in Juvenile Court, by
Randy Hertz et a. (ALI-ABA, 2008); 73 2 pp.
Water Rights Handbookfor Colorado Professionals, by Pe-
ter D. Nichols et a. (Bradford Publishing Co., 2005);
130 pp.
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